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ABSTRACT
This study contributes to the literature dealing with the influence of macroeconomic factors on accounting information quality, 
since it analyzes the earnings management strategies of firms, specifically identifying different discretionary behaviors among 
economic cycles: 1) different levels of earnings management through accruals between phases of the business cycle, and 2) 
the trade-off between earnings management through accruals and real earnings management. The results indicate that the 
accounting information reported should be analyzed with greater caution by its users, especially in periods of great economic 
oscillations, when managers can increase or reduce opportunistic behavior. The research population comprised non-financial 
companies with shares traded on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa) and the sample 
was composed of 247 firms per year, covering the period from 2000 to 2015 and totaling 2,501 observations. The phases of 
business cycles were used as a proxy for the economic environment and were based on Schumpeter’s (1939) study, which 
divides an business cycle into four distinct phases: expansion, recession, contraction, and recovery. Discretionary accruals 
were estimated according to the Pae (2005) and Paulo (2007) models. Real earnings management was estimated as described 
by Roychowdhury (2006), using only the abnormal behavior of production costs and operational decisions. The results of 
this research show that earnings management strategies, using either accruals or real manipulation, as well as the choice 
between these strategies, are impacted by the economic environment. The evidence suggests that managers have different 
opportunistic behavior in each phase of the business cycle. Specifically, they increase the level of discretionary accruals in 
contractionary phases and reduce it during recoveries, while they manage earnings downwards via real manipulation in 
recessions and contractions.
Keywords: business cycles, financial crisis, earnings management, accounting information quality.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The impact on the capital market of the publication of 
firms’ accounting information has been evidenced since 
the seminal studies by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver 
(1968). However, Lev (1989) claims that studies have 
shown a weakening in the association between return 
and accounting earnings caused by the arbitrariness of the 
accounting measures and by earnings manipulations by 
managers, thus affecting accounting information quality.
By analyzing earnings management (EM) behavior 
in various countries facing financial crises, studies 
have shown that accounting information quality can 
also be impacted by macroeconomic issues. Research 
has revealed that opportunistic behavior on the part of 
managers decreases in times of financial crises (Filip & 
Raffournier, 2014; Kousenidis, Ladas & Negakis, 2013). 
This may occur due to the restricted ability of companies 
to manage earnings through accruals. According to Filip 
and Raffournier (2014), companies with high levels of 
accruals engaged more in income smoothing in crisis 
periods, unlike those with low levels of accruals, which 
reduced income smoothing in these periods. 
However, the literature also reports an increase in EM 
practices in times of crises (Iatridis & Dimitras, 2013; 
Persakis & Iatridis, 2015; Tahinakis, 2014; Trombetta & 
Imperatore, 2014). This inconsistency in the findings of 
previous studies may derive from the existence of a trade-
off between accruals-based earnings management (AEM) 
and real earnings management (REM), depending on 
the costs associated with each EM strategy (Zang, 2012).
Previous studies on financial crises have only analyzed 
one of the earnings management strategies, that is, the 
use of accruals. However, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
reinforce the importance of analyzing both EM strategies 
available to managers, given that AEM does not have 
direct consequences on cash flow, unlike REM.
Furthermore, the studies that address EM and the 
impact of the economic environment have only done so 
by analyzing periods of financial crises. In contrast, this 
study aims to analyze this relationship by adopting the four 
phases of business cycles as a proxy for fluctuations in the 
economic environment. Schumpeter (1939) and Burns 
and Mitchell (1946) describe economic or business cycles 
as fluctuations found in the overall economic activity of 
countries that organize their work, especially in corporate 
business. According to the authors, a business cycle consists 
of four phases: expansion, which occurs almost at the same 
time in many economic activities, similarly followed by 
general recession, contraction, and recovery, which merge 
with the expansionary phase of the following cycle.
Therefore, in this study, we aimed to analyze two points 
that have not yet been explored by the current literature 
concerning the relationship between EM strategies and 
economic cycles:
1. Accruals-based earnings management in the different 
phases of the business cycle: discretionary behavior in 
relation to accruals can be influenced by the business 
cycle in which the firm finds itself. For example, in an 
expansion or a recovery, manages may be more prone 
to reporting more positive company earnings than in 
the others (income maximization) or to exceeding 
market analysts’ expectations. In contrast, in periods of 
contraction or recession, they may report lower results, 
using discretion regarding accruals so that these are 
reversed in the following periods, thus improving 
their future results (big bath).
2. Trade-off between AEM and REM: in light of the 
restrictions on the use of discretionary behavior 
regarding accruals, managers may alter their EM 
strategy in order to serve their own personal interests 
or those of the firm. In addition, in times of business 
crises, for example, it is common for managers to “cut” 
costs in the company in order to improve their results 
at the end of the period.
Thus, in light of the indications regarding the influence 
of the economic environment on accounting information 
quality (Filip & Raffournier, 2014; Iatridis & Dimitras, 
2013; Persakis & Iatridis, 2015) and of the possible 
relationships between EM strategies and the economic 
environment, we are presented with the following research 
problem: what is the influence of business cycles over the 
earnings management strategies used by publicly-traded 
Brazilian companies?
This study analyzed the influence of the economic 
environment, via business cycles, over the accruals-
based or real earnings management strategies used 
by publicly-traded Brazilian companies. In order to 
capture the characteristics of fluctuations in the Brazilian 
economic environment, the four phases of business cycles 
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determined based of the studies by Schumpeter (1939) 
and Burns and Mitchell (1946) were used as a proxy.
According to Zang (2012), as previously presented, 
there are a number of restrictions and incentives associated 
with the earnings manipulations that managers are 
willing to engage in. For example, achieving the earnings 
predicted by market analysts using EM can compromise 
the accounting earnings of the following period. Therefore, 
depending on the phase in which the economy finds itself, 
managers may be more or less likely to engage in EM. 
However, this can differ according to the macroeconomic 
factors in which firms operate. Thus, this study could 
help investors, creditors, and regulatory bodies in their 
decision-making when faced with the fluctuations in the 
economic activity that occur in Brazil.
The relationship proposed in this study is a subject 
that has been scarcely explored by the literature. Some 
studies have only included gross domestic product (GDP) 
to control for the effect of fluctuations in economic 
activity on the proxies for earnings management 
(Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012) or they have 
separated economic fluctuations into only two phases: 
expansion and recession (Dimitras, Kyriakou & Iatridis, 
2015; Jenkins, Kane & Velury, 2009; Jiang, Habib & 
Gong, 2015), as reported by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). However, according 
to Schumpeter (1939), the studies based only on the 
phases of contraction and expansion do not investigate 
smaller oscillations, such as recession and contraction. 
In comparison terms, the NBER’s “contraction” phase 
is divided into the contraction and recession phases, 
and the “expansion” phase is composed of recovery and 
expansion, according to the classification by Schumpeter 
(1939) and Burns and Mitchell (1946).
In the specific case of REM, Kim and Sohn (2013) argue 
that due to the impact on cash flow resulting from the use 
of this strategy, the quality of earnings information used 
by investors is also reduced, thus requiring a higher risk 
premium for companies that manipulate their earnings. 
Therefore, this study is also warranted due to the use of 
accounting information by the capital market, since an 
adequate understanding of the opportunistic behavior of 
managers in the event of changes in the country’s economy 
could help in decision making regarding the allocation 
of the resources available to investors, for example by 
contributing to an improvement in financial analysts’ 
forecasts or to adequate credit risk analysis in view of 
the different discretionary behaviors depending on the 
phase of the business cycle.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Business cycles originate from fluctuations in the level 
of a country’s economic activity, generally measured by 
GDP. The NBER, the US body responsible for identifying 
business cycles, divides one full cycle into two phases: 
recession and expansion. For the NBER, recession occurs 
when there are two or more consecutive quarters of 
negative GDP, while expansion occurs when there are 
two or more consecutive quarters of GDP growth (Knopp, 
2010). Cycles are measured based on peaks and troughs. 
For example, the peak of an expansion is the point in time 
at which the level of GDP reaches its maximum before 
beginning to decline. Thus, the peak of an expansion marks 
the start of a recession. Similarly, the trough of a recession 
is the moment at which GDP has fallen to its lowest level 
before beginning to rise again, which means that a trough 
marks the start of an expansion (Knopp, 2010).
Schumpeter (1939) defends a four-stage cyclical process, 
which presents growth in economic activity in the recovery 
and expansion phases, with a reduction in this activity 
occurring in the recession and depression phases. The 
author refers to the concept of equilibrium state. Although 
this state can never actually occur, he claims that it is valid 
solely as a reference point, since various events (political, 
cultural, natural, etc.) collide with the economic world, 
which is already disturbed and unbalanced. In Schumpeter’s 
(1939) view, there is a tendency to equilibrium, which 
after each excursion draws the system back towards a 
new equilibrium state. The author also notes that this 
tendency is caused by a real force (innovations) and not by 
the mere existence of ideal equilibrium points of reference. 
In support, Burns and Mitchell (1946) also classify business 
cycles into four distinct phases: expansion, recession, 
contraction, and recovery.
However, the studies that address the relationship 
between fluctuations in business cycles and their impact 
on the characteristics of accounting information have 
done so either by including dummy variables only for 
specific times of crisis (Davis-Friday, Eng & Liu, 2006; 
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Filip & Raffournier, 2014; Kousenidis et al., 2013; Persakis 
& Iatridis, 2015) or by using the binary classification 
published by the NBER (Dimitras et al., 2015; Jenkins 
et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2015). Unlike previous papers, 
this one has conducted the study by considering the four 
phases of business cycles. 
According to Schipper (1989), earnings management 
is related to disclosure management, that is, a deliberate 
intervention in the process of externally disclosing 
financial information with the intention of achieving 
some particular gain. Similarly, for Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), earnings management occurs when managers use 
their judgment in financial reports to structure operations 
with the aim of misleading some parties interested in the 
company’s underlying economic performance or in order 
to influence the contractual results that depend on the 
accounting numbers reported. 
In a study carried out involving companies in the 
European stock market, Dimitras et al. (2015) examined the 
consequences of the European financial crisis in relation 
to earnings management and found that companies tend 
to reduce earnings management practices in times of 
crisis. However, the authors warn that the results may 
depend on specific aspects of each country’s economic 
environment. 
Kousenidis et al. (2013) sought to determine 
whether, and to what extent, the crisis in the European 
Union had an impact on the earnings quality of listed 
companies in countries with weak fiscal sustainability. 
The results of this study indicate that, on average, the 
accounting information quality improved. During the 
crisis period, companies appear to report more timely, 
more conservative, more relevant, less smoothed, 
less managed, more persistent, and more predictable 
earnings. However, these results are slightly different 
for those companies that have the greatest absolute 
discretionary accruals in the crisis period. Borio (2014) 
reports that, despite the financial cycle being longer than 
the business cycle, financial crises are also generally 
accompanied by the recessionary phase of the business 
cycle.
Therefore, in light of the absence of studies on the 
relationship between the level of earnings management 
and the four phases of business cycles and the evidence 
from previous studies on financial crises presenting 
indications that the level of earnings management may 
be associated with the phases of business cycles, we are 
presented with the following research hypothesis:
H1: discretionary behavior in relation to the accounting choices 
(accruals) of publicly-traded Brazilian companies is influenced 
by the country’s business cycle.
However, earnings management can occur via both 
accruals and operational decisions. According to Zang 
(2012), the decision regarding the type of management 
managers are willing to engage in depends on the cost 
associated with each one. The author also claims that 
managers use AEM or REM as substitutes; that is, 
managers adjust the level of discretionary accruals in 
accordance with the level of REM.
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) claim that managers 
alternate between both EM methods based on their 
relative costs, and that the level of accruals for the 
period is adjusted according to the level of REM carried 
out in the year. This study showed that companies that 
have issued shares in the market manage their earnings 
both via accruals and via REM, and that reduced 
earnings are more associated with REM than with 
accruals. Gunny (2010) considers that REM has greater 
costs for managers since, unlike accruals, they have 
direct consequences on cash flow and can therefore 
have a damaging economic impact on the firm’s value 
in the long term.
In light of the evidence of changes in earnings 
management strategy between AEM and REM and of 
changes in discretionary behavior depending on the 
phases of the business cycle, we have the second research 
hypothesis:
H2: the business cycle impacts the choice of earnings management 
strategy, that is, the use of accruals or real activities, of publicly-
traded Brazilian firms. 
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3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
3.1. Population and Sample
The sample in the study derives from the population of 
public companies with shares traded on the São Paulo Stock, 
Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa) 
between 2000 and 2015. This population was chosen due 
to the obligation to publish annual accounting statements, 
as well as due to it being composed of companies from 
various sectors of economic activity. The accounting 
data used in this study to calculate discretionary accruals 
and real earnings management were collected from the 
Bloomberg® database. To compose the research sample, 
financial institutions and insurers were excluded, as these 
companies have a different ownership and operational 
structure and they also present a high degree of leverage 
that can distort the calculation of the variables used by 
the earnings management estimation models. In addition, 
observations with some incomplete field and outliers 
identified via boxplot analysis were excluded. Table 1 
describes the composition of the sample.
The sectors were grouped according to the classification 
of the Bloomberg® database using the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) methodology. As Table 
1 shows, the sample is composed of 14 sectors, of which 
the Public Utility and Telecommunications, Personal and 
Domestic Products, and Industrial Goods and Services 
sectors warrant mentioning for having a greater number 
of both firms and observations per sector.
Table 1 
Description of the research sample covering 2000 to 2015
Description
Quantity
Companies Observations
Number of non-financial firms in 
the Brazilian stock market
278 4,448
Data missing for the calculation of the variables 20 1,991
Observations considered outliers 11 44
Research sample (companies per year) 247 2,501
Sector
Health 5 61
Oil and Gas 5 50
Technology 5 73
Vehicles and Autoparts 7 76
Travel and Leisure 7 72
Chemical Products 9 100
Building Materials 13 124
Basic Resources 18 221
Real Estate 18 179
Food and Drink 20 153
Retail 23 218
Industrial Products and Services 32 314
Personal and Domestic Products 37 388
Public Utility and Communications 48 472
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The analysis period is warranted due to the fact that 
it covers moments of economic-financial crises, as well 
as times of expansion in the Brazilian economy. Figure 1 
presents the percentage variation in quarterly Brazilian 
GDP between the 1st quarter of 1999 and the 2nd quarter 
of 2015.
In Figure 1, it is possible to note periods followed 
by positive variations in GDP between 2002 and 2008, 
below and above the mean, treated here as tendency to 
equilibrium, as described by Schumpeter (1939), and thus 
characterizing periods of Brazilian economic recovery and 
expansion. From 2009 to 2010, the economy recovers, but 
it suffers another recession and economic contraction until 
2015, when consecutive negative results are observed for 
GDP growth, above and below the mean. These phases 
were identified as described in item 3.2.
Edilson Paulo & Renato Henrique Gurgel Mota
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Figure 1 
Percentage variation in gross domestic product (GDP) by quarter in relation to the previous quarter – 2000 to 2015
Source: Bloomberg®, 2016.
Therefore, the period analyzed is marked by both 
reductions and growth in GDP, thus forming the 
fluctuations that give rise to the business cycles that 
occurred in Brazil.
3.2. Research Variables
The business cycles were divided into four phases 
(expansion, recession, contraction, and recovery) 
identified in accordance with Schumpeter (1939). 
The mean of the real variations in GDP was treated as 
tendency to equilibrium, based on which the expansion 
and recession phases were separated from the contraction 
and recovery phases. Two quarters before and after the 
study period were added to enable a full analysis of the 
period studied. 
So, starting from an expansion, GDP varies positively 
and above the mean. During recession, there continues 
to be above-average growth, but with negative variations. 
During contraction, the economy heads towards a 
recession – contraction of the economy for two or more 
consecutive quarters – with GDP variations being negative 
and below average. It is during recovery that the economy 
returns to growth, with positive variations in real GDP, but 
still below tendency to equilibrium, until the next phase, 
which begins a new cycle starting with the expansionary 
phase. The classification of the phases is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Phases of a business cycle according to Schumpeter (1939)
GDP = gross domestic product
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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To define the periods of peaks and troughs, this study 
used the same algorithm applied by Claessens, Kose, and 
Terrones (2012), which seeks maximums and minimums 
in a series over a particular time period. Specifically, a 
peak in a time series occurs at point t, given the variation 
in GDP (y) if
Consequently, the trough in a time series occurs if
Thus, a peak is marked by at least two consecutive 
periods of GDP growth followed by two periods of 
reduction. In contrast, a trough consists of at least two 
consecutive periods of falling GDP, accompanied by two 
periods of uninterrupted growth. Finally, each phase was 
identified via dummy variables, indicating the periods 
of expansion (EXP), recession (RECES), contraction 
(CONT), and recovery (RECOV).
Due to the time period of this study, earnings 
management was measured on an annual basis. However, 
the variations in the business cycles were analyzed 
quarterly so that there was no loss of information. The 
phases of the cycles were included in the EM detection 
models, considering the phase of the cycle at the end of 
the year under analysis.
3.3. Estimation of the Abnormal Behavior of the 
REM and of the Accruals
The REM was calculated using the models proposed 
by Roychowdhury (2006), which measure the normal 
levels of a company’s activities in order to then find their 
abnormal behavior via the estimation error. Abnormal 
behaviors were found for production costs and for 
operational expenses in accordance with equations 3 
and 4, respectively.
in which Prodit are the production costs of company i in 
period t, At-1 are the total assets of company i in period t-1, 
Sit is net sales of company i in period t, ∆Sit is change in 
net sales of company i from period t-1 to period t, ∆Sit-1 is 
change in net sales of company i from period t-2 to period 
t-1, Expit are selling, general and administrative expenses 
of company i in period t, Sit-1 is net sales of company i in 
period t-1, all weighted by the total assets at the end of 
period t-1, εit is the error term of the regression, and α, 
β´s are the estimated coefficients of the regression.
The REM corresponds to the estimation error of the 
production costs and operational expenses, obtained in 
accordance with Roychowdhury (2006) and treated in 
the results analysis as the sum of the abnormal behavior 
of the production costs (Ab_Prodit) and of the operational 
expenses (Ab_Expit) multiplied by -1. As they present 
different expected signs in their residuals, this multiplication 
serves to indicate that firms with higher values for REMit 
use operational decisions in order to present greater results 
than their real value (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). REMit was 
calculated according to Equation 5.
It is worth noting that, just like Zang (2012), this 
study did not use the estimation of the behavior of the 
operational cash flow, since according to the author the 
net effect of the manipulation of operational decisions 
over cash flow is ambiguous as it is affected in different 
directions. For example, discounts in sales prices and 
overproduction reduce the cash flow from operational 
activities, while reductions in discretionary expenses 
cause an increase in this cash flow.
Discretionary accruals were estimated using the model 
proposed by Paulo (2007), also used in other studies 
applied in the Brazilian market, such as Mota, Silva, 
Oliveira, and Paulo (2017). This methodology was chosen 
as it reduces some problems indicated in the research on 
the subject relating to the correlation between accruals, 
operational cash flow, and accounting earnings, the level 
of conservatism, the reversal of accruals, and also because 
it controls the impact of REM on the estimations of firms’ 
total accruals (Paulo, 2007). As a robustness test, we also 
1
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used a model in which there was no control for REM 
in the estimation of total accruals. In this case, we used 
the Pae (2005) model applied in the Brazilian market 
in studies such as that of Domingos, Ponte, Paulo, and 
Alencar (2017).
It was necessary to include in the Paulo (2007) model 
the variable with information about intangibles, only 
present in Brazilian accounting statements from 2007 
onwards. Deferred assets are also only present until that 
same year, with rare exceptions, as the process of adopting 
the international accounting standards began in Brazil. 
After robustness tests, in order to analyze how this variable 
would compose the model, whether individually or added 
to deferred assets, it was verified that this last alternative 
presented the best adjustment to the model. So, the Pae 
(2005) and Paulo (2007) models were used in this study 
as described in equations 6 and 7.
Paulo (2007) Model
Pae (2005) Model
in which TAit are the total accruals of company i in 
period t, Sit are net sales of company i in period t, PPEit 
are property, plant, and equipment of company i at the 
end of period t, IntDefit are the deferred assets added 
to the intangibles of company i at the end of period t, 
and NIit is the net income of company i in period t, all 
weighted by the total assets at the end of period t-1. 
∆NIit-1 is change in net income of company i from year 
t-2 to year t-1 weighted by the value of the total assets 
at the start of year t-2, D∆NIit-1 is the dummy variable 
for the existence of a negative change in net income of 
company i from year t-2 to year t-1, taking the value 
of 1 if ∆NIit-1 < 0 and 0 otherwise, CFit is the operating 
cash flow of company i at the end of period t weighted 
by the total assets at the end of period t-1, CFit-1 is the 
operating cash flow of company i at the end of period 
t-1 weighted by the total assets at the end of period t-2, 
Ab_Prodit and Ab_Expit are the residuals from equations 3 
and 4, ∆Sit are change in net sales of company i in period 
t, TAit-1 are the total accruals of company i in period t-1 
weighted by the total assets at the end of period t-2, εit 
is the error term of the regression, and α, β´s are the 
estimated coefficients of the regression.
The dependent variable, total accruals, was obtained in 
accordance with Paulo (2007), and calculated as described 
in Equation 8.
in which TAit are the total accruals of company i in 
period t, ∆CAit is change in the current assets of company 
i from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t, ∆Cashit 
is change in the cash and cash equivalent of company i 
from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t, ∆CLit 
is change in the current liabilities of company i from the 
end of period t-1 to the end of period t, ∆CDit is change 
in debt in current liabilities of company i from the end of 
period t-1 to the end of period t, Deprit is change in the 
depreciations and amortizations of company i from the 
end of period t-1 to the end of period t, and Ait-1 are the 
total assets of company i at the end of period t-1.
3.4. Regressions Model
The models defined to achieve the aim of the 
research were based on the general EM detection model 
described by McNichols and Wilson (1988), as shown 
in Equation 9.
in which DAcct are the discretionary accruals of firm 
i in period t, PARTt are the factors related to earnings 
management, and εt is the error term.
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The general model was adapted in this study for the 
two earnings management strategies, AEM and REM. 
Also, the dummy variables representing each phase of 
business cycles were added separately, in addition to some 
control variables, as described in Equation 10.
in which the dependent variable, EMit, represents the 
two proxies for the two types of earnings management 
used in the study, real earnings management (REM) and 
accruals-based earnings management (DAcc).
This was necessary to identify the impact of the 
economic environment on each one of the EM strategies. 
The Cyclet variable represents each phase of the business 
cycle that the country’s economy is experiencing in period 
t, obtained as explained in item 3.2. The following control 
variables were obtained based on the literature: 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥�� 1 
 2 represents the percentage variation in cumulative GDP 
for the year in relation to the same period of the previous 
year; Sizeit is the company’s size measured by the natural 
logarithm of the total assets of company i in year t; ROAit 
are the earnings before extraordinary items of company 
i in period t weighted by the total assets at the end of 
period t-1; Levit is the total short and long term debts 
of company i in year t weighted by the total assets at the 
end of period t-1, and POSIFRS is a dummy variable that 
is 1 for accounting information after total convergence 
of the accounting rules with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the country.
Cohen and Zarowin (2007) report that the proxies used 
in detecting earnings management can be contaminated 
by fluctuations in economic activity; thus, the authors 
included variations in GDP in their models as a way of 
controlling this effect. In light of the correlation found 
between the phases of business cycles and the Δ%GDPit, 
VIF (variance inflation factor) tests were carried out for 
multicollinearity. The results indicate that there are no 
problems including the variables in the models, given 
the low value found for the tests of each regression, with 
a maximum value of 1.59.
The size variable (Sizeit) is related to the company’s size 
and is used in various national and international studies. 
For example, for Watts and Zimmerman (1990), bigger 
companies are more exposed to the investor market, 
and this causes a disincentive to practicing earnings 
management in light of the resulting political cost of this 
practice. In Brazil, some studies have found a significant 
relationship between discretionary accruals and company 
size (Ardison, Martinez & Galdi, 2012; Barros, Menezes, 
Colauto & Teodoro, 2014).
As a measure of company performance, this study 
used return on assets (ROAit), since, as found in previous 
studies, by using earnings management it is possible 
to increase or reduce accounting earnings. In Brazil, 
Barros, Soares, and Lima (2013) and Joia and Nakao 
(2014) indicated that there is a negative relationship 
with discretionary accruals. One explanation for this 
relationship lies in the nature of this variable, which 
depends on earnings; consequently, the accruals from 
one period can be reversed in the following period, which 
can raise or reduce a company’s earnings. 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Minton and Schrand 
(1999) argue that companies have incentives to influence 
discretionary items of accounting, whether to avoid 
violating contractual obligations or to avoid adverse effects 
on the classification of their debts. Thus, various studies 
include the leverage (Levit) variable, which relates short 
and long term debts and total assets (Bekiris & Doukakis, 
2011; Gu, Lee & Rosett, 2005). In Brazil, this relationship 
between earnings management and leverage has also 
been shown to be significant, such as in the studies by 
Ardison et al. (2012), Barros et al. (2014), and Joia and 
Nakao (2014). 
Another controlled aspect relates to the IFRS adoption 
period. In Brazil, the enactment of Law n. 11.638/2007 
of December 28th of 2007 enabled Brazil to adopt IFRS, 
and since 2010 onwards all public companies have been 
obliged to publish their accounting reports in accordance 
with this standard. Studies carried out in the Brazilian 
stock market have been inconclusive in relation to the 
alterations in the level of earnings management (Grecco, 
2013; Joia & Nakao, 2014).
With the aim of verifying the existence or not of a trade-
off between accruals-based and real earnings management 
strategies, this study is based on the model proposed by 
Zang (2012), which in the model with accruals includes 
the residuals of the regression of the model described in 
Equation 10 as a dependent variable, with REM being the 
explained variable (Unexp_REMit). According to Zang 
(2012), the level of accruals is adjusted in accordance with 
the level of REM. Therefore, Equation 11 describes the 
model used to verify the existence of a trade-off between 
the EM strategies. 
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Thus, a negative and significant sign is expected for the 
Unexp_REMit variable, which indicates the substitution 
of EM strategies; otherwise, if the sign is positive and 
significant, complementarity occurs between the two 
strategies.
4. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the earnings management proxies used in this study separated by 
phase of the business cycle.
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and normality test of the research variables covering 2000 to 2015
n Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Min. Max.
Shapiro-Francia
Coeff. p-value
Expansion
DAccit (Paulo) 643 0.0074 0.0000 0.1334 -0.3157 0.4510 0.9361 0.000
DAccit (Pae) 643 0.0092 -0.0007 0.1611 -0.4488 0.5742 0.9141 0.000
Ab_Prodit 643 -0.0094 0.0017 0.1252 -0.4184 0.3452 0.9654 0.000
Ab_Expit 643 0.0014 -0.0205 0.1212 -0.2771 0.4776 0.9131 0.000
REMit 643 -0.0100 0.0201 0.2222 -0.7841 0.5442 0.9366 0.000
Recession
DAccit (Paulo) 301 0.0000 -0.0028 0.1130 -0.3157 0.4510 0.9488 0.000
DAccit (Pae) 301 0.0036 0.0075 0.1381 -0.4488 0.5742 0.9056 0.000
Ab_Prodit 301 0.0008 0.0129 0.1220 -0.4184 0.3452 0.9586 0.000
Ab_Expit 301 0.0021 -0.0170 0.1173 -0.2771 0.4776 0.8929 0.000
REMit 301 -0.0010 0.0312 0.2158 -0.7841 0.5442 0.9165 0.000
Contraction
DAccit (Paulo) 1.237 -0.0009 -0.0042 0.1084 -0.3157 0.4510 0.9336 0.000
DAccit (Pae) 1.237 -0.0054 -0.0009 0.1299 -0.4488 0.5742 0.9096 0.000
Ab_Prodit 1.237 0.0039 0.0161 0.1251 -0.4184 0.3452 0.9526 0.000
Ab_Expit 1.237 -0.0011 -0.0217 0.1191 -0.2771 0.4776 0.9050 0.000
REMit 1.237 0.0061 0.0433 0.2223 -0.7841 0.5442 0.9324 0.000
Recovery
DAccit (Paulo) 320 -0.0147 -0.0081 0.1016 -0.3157 0.4217 0.9474 0.000
DAccit (Pae) 320 -0.0220 -0.0108 0.1221 -0.4488 0.5742 0.9104 0.000
Ab_Prodit 320 0.0043 0.0127 0.1320 -0.4184 0.3452 0.9562 0.000
Ab_Expit 320 -0.0026 -0.0234 0.1277 -0.2771 0.4776 0.9003 0.000
REMit 320 0.0077 0.0307 0.2344 -0.7841 0.5442 0.9397 0.000
Note: the variables are described in the text.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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The DAccit variable, estimated by both the Pae (2005) 
model and by the Paulo (2007) model, presented, on 
average, similar signs in all four phases of the business 
cycles, with positive signs in the expansion and recession 
phases, indicating a greater amount of positive accruals. In 
contrast, the negative signs in the contraction and recovery 
phases indicate, on average, a greater amount of negative 
values. That is, there are indications that managers manage 
their earnings upwards in the expansion and economic 
recession phases and manage them downwards during 
contractions and recoveries, using accruals. 
The proxy for operational decisions, REMit, presented, 
on average, opposing signs to those found for DAccit, 
in this case negative for the expansion and recession 
phases, indicating lower levels of REMit in these phases. 
The positive signs for contraction and recovery indicate 
a greater use of this strategy by managers in these phases. 
The opposing signs between DAccit and REMit between the 
phases may indicate a trade-off in the choice of strategy 
used by managers, depending on the phase of the business 
cycle. In the other phases, the signs are the opposite of 
Ab_Expit and Ab_Prodit, indicating, on average, that both 
strategies act in favor of the REMit sign.
Table 3 presents the Spearman (non-parametric) 
correlation and Pearson (parametric) correlation matrix 
of the variables used in the regressions that respond to the 
problems of the study. However, as the Shapiro-Francia 
normality test (Table 2) indicates that all the variables do 
not present a normal distribution, for analysis purposes 
the use of the Spearman non-parametric correlation is 
recommended (Levin & Fox, 2004).
From the analysis of the correlation between the 
variables in the study, a strong correlation (> 0.7) stands 
out between DAccit, estimated by the Pae (2005) and 
Paulo (2007) models, as was already expected, since both 
concern discretionary accruals estimated by different 
models. However, the relationship between these and 
REMit is positive for the Paulo (2007) model and negative 
in relation to the other model. The explanation lies in 
the fact that the Paulo (2007) model already controls, in 
the estimation of the residuals, the effect of REM on the 
firms’ total accruals. The Ab_Prodit and Ab_Expit variables 
also presented a strong correlation with REMit, given that 
both are used for calculating this proxy.
Table 3 
Spearman (lower part of the triangle) and Pearson (upper part of the triangle) correlation matrix
DAccit
(Paulo)
DAccit
(Pae)
Ab_
Prodit
Ab_Expit REMit Sizeit ROAit Levit IFRSt ∆%GDPit EXPit RECESit CONTit RECOVit
DAccit (Paulo) 1 0.840 0.009 -0.014 0.006 -0.008 0.016 0.029 -0.022 0.048 0.040 0.001 -0.004 -0.048
DAccit (Pae) 0.7647 1 -0.112 0.045 -0.091 0.086 0.224 -0.068 -0.022 0.057 0.050 0.017 -0.019 -0.053
Ab_Prodit 0.0307 -0.0971 1 -0.666 0.912 -0.007 -0.308 0.119 0.080 -0.045 -0.045 0.002 0.029 0.013
Ab_Expit -0.0352 0.0321 -0.6057 1 -0.906 -0.050 -0.045 -0.110 -0.052 0.026 0.008 0.007 -0.007 -0.007
REMit 0.0318 -0.0766 0.8930 -0.8672 1 0.023 -0.142 0.128 0.073 -0.043 -0.030 -0.004 0.021 0.011
Sizeit 0.0013 0.0933 -0.0221 -0.0589 0.0065 1 0.309 0.019 0.173 -0.069 -0.089 0.000 0.067 0.016
ROAit -0.0180 0.2007 -0.4128 0.0224 -0.2468 0.1967 1 -0.405 -0.078 0.122 0.046 0.054 -0.086 0.016
Levit 0.0468 -0.0420 0.1139 -0.1176 0.1165 0.2435 -0.2553 1 0.049 -0.074 -0.043 -0.026 0.059 -0.008
IFRSt -0.0355 -0.0209 0.1083 -0.0782 0.1058 0.1775 -0.1152 0.0650 1 -0.407 -0.595 0.105 0.388 0.096
∆%GDPit 0.0326 0.0495 -0.0475 0.0218 -0.0420 -0.0456 0.1408 -0.0652 -0.3202 1 0.538 0.390 -0.732 0.012
EXPit 0.0284 0.0327 -0.0576 0.0213 -0.0466 -0.0913 0.0645 -0.0515 -0.5951 0.5677 1 -0.218 -0.582 -0.225
RECESit 0.0088 0.0379 -0.0045 0.0143 -0.0090 -0.0002 0.0728 -0.0237 0.1051 0.4915 -0.2176 1 -0.366 -0.142
CONTit -0.0068 -0.0174 0.0430 -0.0190 0.0389 0.0682 -0.1071 0.0639 0.3876 -0.8137 -0.5820 -0.3659 1 -0.379
RECOVit -0.0357 -0.0536 0.0153 -0.0135 0.0114 0.0176 0.0049 -0.0051 0.0961 -0.0037 -0.2253 -0.1417 -0.3789 1
Note: the variables are described in the text. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
From the control variables included in the models 
and considering the Spearman correlation, it can be 
noted that only Levit and IFRSt were significant for the 
Paulo (2007) model. In relation to the Pae (2005) model, 
besides leverage, Sizeit and ROAit were also significant. 
Regarding real earnings management, ROAit, Levit, and 
IFRSt were significant. Thus, it is expected that adding 
these variables to the models can control the effect on 
earnings management by these firm characteristics. 
Regarding the phases of the business cycles and 
earnings management, a significant negative correlation 
is observed between the recovery phase and the accruals 
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estimated by the models. The expansion and recession 
phases have a significant positive correlation with the 
discretionary accruals based on the Pae (2005) model. 
The expansion and contraction phases of business cycles 
were also significant for REM.
Figure 3 Behavior of the earnings management proxies between 2000 and 2015
AEM = accruals-based earnings management; REM = real earnings management; GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Figure 3 describes the behavior of the EM proxies 
and the GDP of Brazil for the analysis period. In order to 
improve its visualization, only the discretionary accruals 
obtained in accordance with the Paulo (2007) model were 
used, given that this presented a strong correlation with 
what was obtained by the Pae (2005) model. From Figure 
3, it is perceived that both strategies (AEM and REM) 
move together from 2000 until 2005, when an inverse 
relationship between the two EM strategies begins. These 
two strategies present a positive relationship again at the 
end of 2012 until 2013, when the relationship between the 
levels of earnings management inverts once more. This last 
phase occurs precisely when the Brazilian economy begins 
to cool down, with consecutive periods of negative GDP 
growth below the average for the analysis, a period which, 
in accordance with Schumpeter (1939), is classified as a 
contraction. However, these observations are only based 
on the graphic analysis and only considered the variations 
in GDP, the basis for the classification of the phases of 
business cycles, which are the focus of this study. Thus, 
more robust analyses are presented in the next sections.
4.2. Analysis of Earnings Management in the 
Phases of Business Cycles
In order to verify the significance of the variables 
referring to the phases of business cycles in relation to 
AEM and REM, an unbalanced panel data analysis was 
carried out. Initially, an analysis was conducted of which 
model most adapted to the data: random effects, fixed 
effects, or pooled ordinary least squares (POLS). For all 
the regressions used to estimate the abnormal behavior 
of the variables related with EM, the Breusch-Pagan tests 
were used, which verify the adequacy of the POLS model 
in relation to the random effects model; in this case, the 
results indicated that the POLS model is not the most 
adequate. The Hausman test verifies whether the random 
effects model provides more consistent estimates of the 
parameters in relation to the fixed effects models, and 
the results also rejected the null hypothesis; that is, the 
random effects model does not adapt better to the data 
in relation to the fixed effects panel. Finally, the Chow 
tests also rejected the null hypothesis, confirming that 
the fixed effects model fits the data. This procedure was 
carried out for all the equations and the results were 
identical. The statistical tests of the models indicate that 
all reject the null hypothesis of normality by means of 
the Jarque-Bera test. However, in accordance with the 
central limit theorem, Wooldridge (2014) claims that 
in large samples the presumption of normality can be 
relaxed. The Wald and Wooldridge tests also revealed 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, 
respectively, in practically all the models. With the aim 
of correcting their effects in the regressions, the models 
were estimated with robust or clusterized standard errors, 
when this was the case.
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Table 4 presents the results of the regressions concerning the relationship between the economic environment 
and AEM by the Pae (2005) and Paulo (2007) models.
Table 4 
Relationship between the business cycles and AEM – 2000 to 2015
Phase Expansion Recession Contraction Recovery
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Panel A – Paulo (2007) Model
Cycleit 0.005 0.68 0.006 -0.68 0.014
** 2.21 -0.015*** -2.55
∆%GDPit 0.001
** 1.97 0.002** 2.46 0.003*** 3.55 0.002** 2.50
Sizeit 0.000 0.08 0.001 0.08 0.001 0.14 0.001 0.10
ROAit 0.051 1.16 0.051 1.14 0.048 1.07 0.050 1.14
Levit 0.005 0.16 0.005 0.16 0.004 0.14 0.004 0.15
IFRSt -0.006 -0.71 -0.006 -0.86 -0.009 -1.40 -0.007 -0.96
_cons -0.009 -0.19 -0.008 -0.17 -0.019 -0.41 -0.006 -0.14
R² 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010
Observations (n) 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501
Panel B – Pae (2005) Model
Cycleit 0.014 1.61 -0.004 -0.45 0.013
* 1.74 -0.023*** -3.69
∆%GDPit 0.001 1.29 0.002
** 2.19 0.003*** 3.00 0.002** 2.33
Sizeit -0.004 -0.51 -0.003 -0.39 -0.003 -0.37 -0.004 -0.42
ROAit 0.265
*** 4.49 0.261*** 4.43 0.258*** 4.38 0.261*** 4.45
Levit 0.017 0.46 0.017 0.45 0.017 0.44 0.017 0.45
IFRSt 0.007 0.74 0.001 0.18 -0.001 -0.09 0.003 0.32
_cons 0.009 0.15 0.006 0.11 -0.003 -0.06 0.010 0.17
R² 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.045
Observations (n) 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501
Note: the variables are described in the text.
AEM = accruals-based earnings management.
*, **, *** = significant to the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In general, the results of Table 4 show a low explanatory 
power of the variations in the accruals estimated by both 
models, and only some variables of the models were 
presented as significant.
Regarding the relationship between EM and the 
phases of the business cycles, it is verified that during 
the contraction phase companies engage in earnings 
management, increasing the level of discretionary 
accruals, since the Cycleit variable presented a positive 
sign that was statistically significant to 10% and to 5% in 
this phase, according to the Pae (2005) and Paulo (2007) 
models, respectively. In this phase, the economy presents 
consecutive negative variations in GDP, including below 
the mean; that is, in this period of considerable economic 
slowdown, firms increase their level of accruals-based 
earnings management. The coefficients of the CONTit 
(contraction) variable for the Pae (2005) and Paulo (2007) 
models were 0.013 and 0.014, respectively, indicating that 
a positive variation occurred in the discretionary accruals 
in this phase, on average 1.3% and 1.4% greater than in 
relation to the other phases.
In the recovery period, there are indications that 
managers reduce the level of discretionary accruals, 
since the Cycleit variable was negative and significant for 
this phase, to 1% for both models used. That is, at the 
moment in which the economy starts to exit consecutive 
falls in GDP growth, firms may be reducing their levels 
of accruals as a way of dealing with this phase that the 
economy is undergoing. In this phase, the coefficients of 
the RECOVit variable for the Pae (2005) and Paulo (2007) 
models were -0.023 and -0.015, respectively, indicating 
that a negative variation occurred in the discretionary 
accruals, on average 2.4% and 1.5% lower than in relation 
to the other phases.
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Table 5 presents the results of the relationship between REM and the economic environment.
Table 5 
Relationship between the business cycles and REM – 2000 to 2015
Phase of the cycle Expansion Recession Contraction Recovery
Model REM REM REM REM
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Cycleit 0.017 2.73 -0.013
** -2.04 -0.014*** -2.88 0.008 1.48
∆%GDPit -0.003
*** -2.77 -0.001 -1.34 -0.003*** -3.60 -0.002*** -2.26
Sizeit 0.034
*** 3.00 0.035*** 3.06 0.036*** 3.18 0.036*** 3.18
ROAit 0.031 0.48 0.027 0.41 0.026 0.41 0.024 0.37
Levit -0.001 -0.03 -0.002 -0.04 -0.002 -0.04 -0.002 -0.04
IFRSt 0.022
** 1.96 0.021* 1.57 0.016 1.45 0.013 1.24
_cons -0.253*** -3.20 -0.253*** -3.19 -0.250*** -3.17 -0.261*** -3.29
R² 0.062 0.060 0.061 0.060
Observations (n) 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501
Note: the variables are described in the text.
REM = real earnings management.
*, **, *** = significant to the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The results in Table 5 reveal the significant and negative 
relationship between both the recession and contraction 
phases and REMit, indicating a reduction in the level of 
this earnings management strategy, precisely in this phase 
in which the economy presents a negative variation in 
GDP growth, after a period of consecutive rises. That is, 
managers appear to adjust firm operations to cope with 
this period of slowdown in the economy. For the recession 
phase, the RECESit variable in the estimation for the real 
earnings management model has a negative coefficient 
of 0.013, indicating that abnormal behavior in the firms’ 
operational activities undergoes a negative variation, by 
an average of 1.3% in relation to the other phases of the 
business cycle, while in the contraction (CONTit) phase, 
the abnormal behavior of real activities undergoes an 
average reduction of 1.4%.
Including the GDP variation in the earnings 
management models serves to capture the fluctuations 
in the economy so that the proxies for AEM and REM 
only reflect the discretionary behavior of managers in 
manipulating accounting earnings (Cohen & Zarowin, 
2007). In Table 4, it is observed that the Δ%GDPit variable 
was positive and significant in all the estimates, except 
in the expansion phase for AEM measured by the Pae 
(2005) model and in recession for the abnormal behavior 
of operational activities (Table 5).
These results indicate that the discretionary accruals 
and the abnormal behavior of real activities are related 
with the phases of the business cycle, therefore it is 
important to control the effects of the cycles in studies 
on accruals-based and/or real earnings management. In 
addition, for the sample of this study, the results suggest 
an average variation in discretionary accruals of between 
0.1% and 0.3% for every 1 percentage point variation 
in GDP, depending on the phase of the business cycle. 
For example, in contraction, if there was 1% increase in 
GDP, accruals would increase by 0.3%. Note that this 
finding suggests that part of the variation in the abnormal 
behavior of accruals is related with the business cycle and 
not with the discretionary behavior of managers. 
Regarding real earnings management, the variation in 
GDP, which is a proxy for the performance of economic 
activities, also influences the volume of real activities, with 
the results indicating that the Δ%GDP explains between 
0.1% and 0.3% of the variation in the abnormal behavior 
of the real activities of the firms in the sample. That is, 
as expected, the firms’ (real) operational activities are 
influenced by macroeconomic factors. Thus, as observed 
in the behavior of the accruals, a portion of the variation 
in the firms’ operational activities is also related to the 
macroeconomic environment, and not only to the 
opportunistic behavior of managers.
In summary, the results presented showed an increase 
in the level of discretionary accruals in the contraction 
phase and a reduction during the recovery phase. Based 
on the empirical evidence presented, the first hypothesis 
of this study is not rejected, since the results indicate the 
influence of business cycles on the behavior of the levels 
of accruals.
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4.3. Analysis of the Trade-Off between the 
Earnings Management Strategies in the 
Phases of the Business Cycles
Preliminarily, the volumes of the residuals of the 
accruals estimation model were compared with the 
residuals of the operational activities estimation models. 
In Table 6, it is observed that the AEMit variable has a 
positive sign in the expansion and recession phases, 
while the REMit variable has a negative sign in these 
phases. However, there is an inversion of signs between 
the AEMit and REMit variables in the contraction and 
recovery phases. This may suggest a trade-off between 
the two EM strategies.
Table 6 
Comparison between the average for AEM and REM – 2000 to 2015
Phase of the cycle Expansion Recession Contraction Recovery
Model Mean
Standard 
deviation
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Mean
Standard 
deviation
AEM 
Paulo 0.0074 0.1334 0.0000 0.1113 -0.0009 0.1084 -0.0147 0.1016
Pae 0.0092 0.1611 0.0036 0.1381 -0.0054 0.1299 -0.0220 0.1221
REM -0.0100 0.2222 -0.010 0.2158 0.0061 0.2223 0.0077 0.2344
AEM = accruals-based earnings management; REM = real earnings management.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In addition, an inversion of the signs is also observed 
for the estimations of the coefficients of the Cycleit variable 
between the AEMit (Table 4) and REMit (Table 5) models or 
a loss of statistical significance, as summarized in Table 7. 
These results may also suggest the confirmation of a trade-
off between accruals-based and real earnings management.
Table 7 
Comparison between the coefficients of the model for AEM and REM – 2000 to 2015
Phase of the cycle Expansion Recession Contraction Recovery
Model Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
AEMit 
Paulo 0.005 0.68 0.006 -0.68 0.014** 2.21 -0.015*** -2.55
Pae 0.014 1.61 -0.004 -0.45 0.013* 1.74 -0.023*** -3.69
REMit 0.017 2.73 -0.013
** -2.04 -0.014*** -2.88 0.008 1.48
AEM = accruals-based earnings management; REM = real earnings management.
*, **, *** = significant to the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The results also indicated a reduction in REM in 
the period of the recession and contraction. The use of 
accruals in the phases in which the economy is presenting 
positive variations and the reduction in the level of REM 
when it begins to present negative variations could be 
explained because REM is considered more expensive 
than AEM, since REM directly impacts the firm’s cash 
flow (Cohen & Zarowin, 2007; Zang, 2012). That is, in 
the expansion and recovery phases, periods of GDP 
growth, managers prefer not to engage in this type of 
management and also reduce the level when the economy 
slows down.
For greater robustness in the analysis of hypothesis 2 of 
this study, Table 8 presents the estimations for the model 
(Equation 11) that seeks to capture the trade-off between 
the AEM and REM earnings management strategies.
Table 8
Analysis of the trade-off between AEM and REM in the business cycles – 2000 to 2015
Panel A – Paulo (2007) Model
Phase of the cycle Expansion Recession Contraction Recovery
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Cycleit 0.006 0.72 -0.006 -0.75 0.014
** 2.22 -0.015*** -2.51
Unexp_REMit -0.054
* -1.72 -0.054* -1.71 0.051* -1.63 -0.052* -1.65
∆%GDPit 0.001
* 1.84 0.002** 2.40 0.003*** 3.50 0.002** 2.40
Sizeit 0.002 0.30 0.002 0.30 0.002 0.35 0.002 0.32
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Panel A – Paulo (2007) Model
Phase of the cycle Expansion Recession Contraction Recovery
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
ROAit 0.063 1.42 0.062 1.40 0.059 1.32 0.061 1.39
Levit 0.001 0.03 0.001 0.03 0.006 0.02 0.009 0.03
IFRSt -0.006 -0.73 -0.007 -0.88 -0.010 -1.44 -0.007 -1.01
_cons -0.018 -0.39 -0.017 -0.37 -0.028 -0.61 -0.016 -0.35
R² 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013
Observations (n) 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501
Panel B – Pae (2005) Model
Cycleit 0.014 1.67 -0.005 -0.55 0.013
* 1.76 -0.023*** -3.58
Unexp_REMit -0.093
** -2.40 -0.091** -2.35 -0.089** -2.29 -0.089** -2.29
∆%GDPit 0.001 1.06 0.002
** 2.07 0.003*** 2.89 0.002** 2.14
Sizeit -0.002 -0.20 -0.001 -0.09 -0.001 -0.06 -0.001 -0.11
ROAit 0.285
*** 4.94 0.280*** 4.86 0.277*** 4.80 0.280*** 4.88
Levit 0.011 0.30 0.011 0.29 0.010 0.28 0.011 0.29
IFRSt 0.007 0.66 0.001 0.12 -0.002 -0.19 0.002 0.21
_cons -0.008 -0.13 0.010 -0.17 -0.020 -0.33 -0.007 0.11
R² 0.049 0.047 0.048 0.051
Observations (n) 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501
Note: the variables are described in the text.
AEM = accruals-based earnings management; REM = real earnings management.
*, **, *** = significant to the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Comparatively analyzing the estimations of the 
discretionary accruals in the four phases of the business 
cycle, it is verified that there were no significant differences 
in the coefficients with or without the REM control (tables 
4 and 5, respectively). Only the R² of the models obtained 
a small average rise of 0.05 for the Pae (2005) model and 
of 0.03 for the Paulo (2007) model.
Concerning the analysis of the trade-off between the EM 
strategies, the coefficients of the Unexp_REMit variable were 
negative and significant in all the phases of the business cycle, 
for both discretionary accruals estimations models (Pae, 
2005; Paulo, 2007). These results suggest that there is a trade-
off between accruals-based and real earnings management; 
thus, the second research hypothesis cannot be rejected.
5. FINAL REMARKS
This study aimed to verify the influence of the 
economic environment over earnings management 
strategies in Brazilian public companies. To achieve 
the objective of the research, the four phases of business 
cycles, based on Schumpeter (1939), were used as a 
proxy for the economic environment, in addition to 
the abnormal behavior of accruals and of operational 
activities for EM.
As the first research hypothesis, it was established 
that accruals-based earnings management is influenced 
by business cycles. The results found indicate that 
it was not possible to reject the hypothesis, as they 
revealed that managers increase the level of accruals in 
the contraction phase, that is, precisely at the time of 
economic slowdown, and they reduce them in recovery. 
By considering the level of firms’ accruals as one of the 
measures of accounting information quality, the findings 
of this study are in line with the studies that have shown a 
deterioration in earnings quality in crisis periods (Iatridis 
& Dimitras, 2013; Persakis & Iatridis, 2015; Tahinakis, 
2014; Trombetta & Imperatore, 2014), since Borio (2014) 
reports that financial crises are generally accompanied 
by the recession phase of the business cycle. However, in 
his study the author considered only two phases of the 
cycle, in accordance with the NBER classification. As this 
study divides the recession phase into two, recession and 
contraction, it cannot be claimed that the level of EM 
worsens in the recession phase. 
The evidence also indicated that in the recession and 
contraction phases, that is, when the economy has slowed 
down after consecutive periods of positive GDP growth, 
managers reduce the level of real earnings management.
Table 8
Cont.
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With regard to the trade-off between accruals-based 
and real earnings management, the results indicate an 
inverse relationship between these two discretionary 
practices. Thus, it was not possible to reject the second 
research hypothesis, which establishes that the business 
cycle has an impact on the choice of EM strategies.
Including the variable related to GDP fluctuations 
provided an improvement in the explanatory power of 
the models, as well as being significant in the analysis of 
the business cycles. In addition to indicating the influence 
of the economic environment on the firms’ accounting 
numbers, this process enabled the variables of the earnings 
management analysis to significantly represent managers’ 
discretionary actions. The results suggest that the abnormal 
behaviors of accruals and of real operational activities are 
related to the macroeconomic environment and not only 
to the opportunistic behavior of managers. This finding 
implies that the studies that analyze accruals-based and/
or real earnings management should control the variation 
in GDP to obtain more robust results. 
The results found add new knowledge in relation 
to the behavior of EM in the face of fluctuations in 
the economic, just like the studies in times of financial 
crises or those that have used the binary classification 
of business cycles. 
This study differs from the rest by confirming the 
relationship between earnings management and the four 
phases of the business cycle, as well as by identifying 
the trade-off between the two earnings management 
strategies in relation to the economic environment. In 
addition, with regard to accounting information quality, 
which can change depending on the phase of the business 
cycle, the findings presented in this study could be used 
by investors and lenders in their decision making, such 
as in the allocation of resources in the capital and credit 
market; by regulators in the elaboration of rules and their 
possible pro-cyclical effects; and by the other users of 
accounting information in evaluating the performance 
of managers and companies. 
The results of this study are limited to the period 
analyzed and, specifically, to the Brazilian stock market. 
Finally, we suggest verifying the reasons that lead managers 
to choosing some of the earnings management strategies 
in relation to the four phases of business cycles.
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